REMOTE CONTROL LOCOMOTIVE OPERATIONS

Sample letter to Congress re: Regulation of Remote Control Technology:

I am writing to you concerning the growing danger of one person locomotive operation, specifically the use of one person remote control operations (RCO). On Mother's day of 2009, in Selkirk, NY, locomotive remote control operator Jared Boehlke was killed while attempting a repair as the sole member of a yard switching crew. If Boehlke had not been assigned to work that job alone, there is no doubt that he would be alive today.

Working a one-man RCO job is akin to performing a complicated juggling act. The operator must always be checking his track list to see that he gets the right cars in the right track. He, alone, must always be operating the correct track switches to see that his train is going to the right location. Add to that the inability to see what is ahead of his engine(s) and operating the engine and answering radio calls. You can readily see that he, alone, is required to juggle many tasks. It takes a herculean effort to do it safely and deal with management’s production pressures.

The Federal Railroad Administration has adopted guidelines for RCO operations, but these guidelines do not actually require the rail carriers to adopt all the necessary safety procedures and in general do not go far enough to ensure that this technology is implemented and utilized safely.

Conventional locomotive engineers are federally licensed, have weeks and weeks of classroom training and months of on-the-job training, sometimes as long as a year. RCO operators take only an 80 hour training course in order to receive their simplified certification. Conventional locomotives must have federal inspections of air valves and of the air brake system any time components are changed. There are no such federal regulations for remote control locomotives. Conventional locomotive operations are governed by strict regulations, while RCO operations are subject only to FRA “guidelines”.

Regulations, not guidelines are needed. Additionally, the ability of rail carriers to “cover-up” accidents involving RCO operations must stop. The carriers must be required to report all accidents involving any RCO operation to a single FRA oversight group.

Regulations governing conventional rail operations are in place to protect not only rail workers but also the public from potentially devastating accidents. That protection is not in place for any of us as long as rail carriers are able to avoid complying with vital RCO safety and operating regulations.

Remote control locomotive technology needs regulation now, and the House Transportation Committee should direct the FRA to ban one person locomotive operations entirely, and enact enforceable regulations to make other RCO operations safer.