Positive Train Control

 

(July 2007)

            On June 26, 2007, the FRA granted waivers approving conditions for additional field testing of BNSF's Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) in several locations in Texas.  The authorization does not include engineer only operations, nor does it apply to Union Pacific Railroad or Amtrak.  As stated below, this new technology has the potential to save lives by increasing safety, but should not be used in lieu of a crew member.  We will continue to keep you posted as to how testing proceeds.

 

 

Background

            You can dress up a pig, but it’s still a pig.  I believe that would sum up the rosy picture the Carriers are painting for the FRA regarding Positive Train Control.  The March 3rd issue of the Federal Register contains an FRA Notification of Petitions for Approval; Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems from the BNSF, CSX and UP railroads.  BNSF submitted a petition for approval of a “Product Safety Plan for its Electronic Train Management System.”  CSX calls theirs a “Railroad Safety Program Plan for Communications Based Train Management System,” and UP’s name is a “Railroad Safety Program Plan for IDOT PTC System and Communications Based Train Control System.”  Such lovely disguises for their real agenda of removing crew members from the cab.  The BLET will be making comments to these petitions during the open comment period. 

 

            If you are unclear as to exactly what PTC is, here’s a little background on the technology.  In theory, the technology could improve rail safety by automatically controlling train movements and speed, potentially preventing collisions between trains, provide warning of other on-track equipment or hazards, and enforce speed limits.  Use of PTC would enhance safety on existing two or three person crews, as it does in Alaska.  However, the Carriers in their continuing zeal to reduce the labor force see it as a way to reduce the crew to maximum of one-person, which brings up a whole new set of safety issues and problems.  The reality of PTC being tested under waivers from the FRA is that the technology has experienced significant failure rates.  In addition, PTC cannot be operated in dark territory, territories that still operate under track warrants rather than signal systems.

 

            In a recent press conference, BLET President Hahs said, “The Carriers’ attempt to reduce crew size has nothing to do with new technology. . . Indeed, the carriers have told the National Transportation Safety Board that implementation of PTC is years away.  Moreover, the Federal Railroad Administration has not conducted a study into the safety and reliability of reduced crew size, nor its impact on an already highly fatigued workforce operating trains through congested areas, carrying highly toxic hazmat during this era of heightened terrorist threats to the security of our nation’s railroads.” 

 

Some examples as to why a one-person crew would be unsafe and impractical include:

 

  • If a train breaks down and blocks a crossing, one person cannot quickly cut the train in two to unblock the crossing, potentially cutting off not only the normal flow of traffic, but blocking the path of emergency vehicles.  This would be not only a threat to public safety, but probably a rules violation.  If there were an emergency, to follow proper procedure, the crew person would have to secure the engine(s) before proceeding to another part of the train.

 

  • Any kind of breakdown, such as loss of an air hose connection, or a broken knuckle would not be able to be fixed by one person.
  • Would the auto pilot a/k/a PTC continue to run the engine, if the crew member requires a restroom break, or should the train be stopped, so as not to take any chances.  I would guess the carriers would not abide by the latter solution, since their only concern is to get their freight over the road, disregarding public safety and the safety of the employee.

 

            Additionally, could one-person crews really be expected to work 12 hour shifts, every 8 hours, when it has already been proven that this schedule builds up to dangerous sleep deficits?  Even if there were 10 hours between shifts, rarely does an employee get 8 hours of rest when commute time, family time, and other factors are taken into account. 

 

            These are only a few examples as to why it should not be implemented in the manner the railroads are hoping for.  It is about public safety, employee safety, and security, not bottom lines.  PTC could be a viable tool when used in conjunction with the eyes and ears of crew members, not as a substitute.  We will keep a very close eye on this issue, and if necessary, you may be asked to weigh in before unproven, experimental technology is implemented on a wide scale as was done with RCO’s.

 

 

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