Remote Control Locomotives
(July 2007 Update)
While some say that Remote Control Locomotive (RCL)
implementation is a dead issue, they are mistaken. Just this year at least 100 jobs across the
nation are being converted to RCL operations, in spite of the evidence that
they are not as efficient as traditional switching operations, and are in fact,
more dangerous. Member at Large Diane
Shifflett, along with her husband Danny, and friend Carol Lee Strickler are
continuing to work on resolutions which speak against the continued
implementation of RCL operations. They
have four so far and are working on the fifth.
At that point, a Resolution will be taken to the state level asking for
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to implement regulations. Ms. Shifflett has been told by FRA personnel
that these resolutions, while having no enforceable value, help them in their
oversight of RCL operations. Because of
the continuing accidents occurring, and flagrant disregard of the existing guidelines,
the FRA is proposing some specific regulations to deal with those issues, but
for the most part leaving the unenforceable guidelines in place. This issue needs continued attention to make
sure the Carriers do not fall back into complacency at the expense of those
employees who work in the yard.
(Summer 2006 Legislative Update)
On June 14, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a report regarding the December 7, 2003, fatality of Jody Herstine, implicating the use of remote control in the accident. A majority of the Board blamed Union Pacific's improper installation of power-assisted switches in the area, but one Board Member, Deborah Helman issued a dissent setting forth many of the safety concerns shared by the BLET and GIA. In her dissent, Ms. Helman cited lack of proper training, and loss of situational awareness, which occurs when Remote Control Locomotive (RCL) operators become overwhelmed with task overload and lose track of what is happening in their immediate surroundings. In a report to Congress issued in April of this year, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) acknowledged that Remote Control Operations (RCOs) lend themselves to task overload, resulting in loss of situation awareness or errors due to the increased tasks and responsibilities of RCL operations. The report also discussed the risk that RCOs may promote "channelized attention" when workers try to manage a large number of tasks while focusing on only one or a few tasks and ignoring the others, a phenomenon that can lead to the loss of situational awareness. Ms. Helman was critical of the NTSB Board itself for missing the opportunity in its first report on a fatal RCL accident to discuss the differences between traditional switching operations and RCL operations and any safety concerns or benefits that may exist. She went on to criticize the report's silence with regard to encouraging railroads to find better ways to properly train operators, especially if they are working alone. However, Ms. Helman missed the point as to what would constitute safer RCL operations in that an RCL operator should never be working alone.
On April 6, 2006, the FRA issued its Final Report on the Safety of Remote Control Locomotive Operations. According the BLET's 15-page response to the FRA, much of the Final Report supports BLET positions; however, they do disagree with the great lengths the FRA went to in putting the "best face" on the technology. The BLET pointed out the FRA's claim that "RCL and conventional train accident rates were virtually identical for those major railroads that made extensive use of both types of operations," even though their own report indicated that accident rates were approximately 25% higher for RCLs than for conventional switching operations." Most of the FRA's erroneous figures stem from the formulas used for calculating their statistics. For instance, if using hours worked vs. yard switching miles for actuating the data, the accident rate is actually 2.3 times higher for RCOs. Using the more accurate methods of calculating the data, injury rates for RCOs is 31.17, while conventional switching is 26.05, and fatality rates are over 3.5 times higher for RCOs. The BLET numbers provided a truer picture of RCO data, and made a good case to the FRA indicating their report was flawed. Let us hope the FRA is paying attention.
Just as with positive train control (PTC), the BLET contends that both of these technologies, implemented and used as a safety tool to help operating crews, not in lieu of those crews, could be a positive step toward safer working conditions. The continuing problem is the Carriers and their greed. The temptation to use technology to circumvent crew members, to the detriment of the remaining crew members and their communities, is just too great for them to resist.
We continue to see this technology implemented at more and more properties around the country, and we as Auxiliary members and members-at-large need to work with the BLET at all levels to ensure our civic leaders are educated and informed as to exactly what these operations entail. We also must educate our communities as to the inherent dangers to which they will be subjected once these operations are put into place.
Remote Control
(Autumn-Winter 2005 Legislative Update)
In late July, the BLET released the Remote Control Hazard Study confirming the inherent dangers of remote control operations. The study was conducted by Dr. Frederick C. Gamst, renowned railroad work organization expert, and George Gavella, former FRA Associate Administrator for Safety. One key finding of the report indicated that major railroads should no longer be permitted to operate remote control locomotives free from regulatory oversight by the FRA. The study reviewed general information and comments, as well as details concerning remote control incidents over a 3-year period. Among the most significant findings:
These findings, while going more in depth than the FRA’s report released in May, echo many of the same sentiments regarding problems with remote control operations. Recommendations from the RCO Hazard Study included: that the FRA audit accident and injury reports submitted by the railroads, so that reliable baseline data can be amassed for remote control accidents and casualty rates; that the FRA refine existing accident investigation procedures to include studying technological or systemic factors that may cause or contribute to accidents; and that the industry should no longer be permitted to regulate itself concerning remote control operations [there’s a concept]. BLET President Don Hahs said “this is the latest piece of evidence that the industry’s hasty and ill-planned implementation of remote control technology – and the FRA’s decision not to grant our 2000 Petition for Rulemaking – have combined to diminish both safety and productivity in switching operations, which is precisely the result we have long predicted. The study also should have a sobering effect on those who continue to advocate a headlong rush to implement new and untested technologies.” Let’s hope that the powers that be are paying attention.
The BLET has published a three-part series called Pretzel Logic. It gives the perspective of recent actions by the FRA, the American Association of Railroads, and the UTU in their efforts to further expand the use of remote control locomotives to main line track. It’s not terribly long, but too long to set forth here. You can find the article, published September 23rd at www.ble.org. Click on more news at the bottom of the main page, and at the search window at the bottom of the next page, type “pretzel” to pull up the articles. If anyone would like a copy, but does not have internet access, give me a call and I will mail it to you.